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755 
A NON-COMPETE CASE IS AN ANTITRUST CASE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA’S POST-
EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW 




Too often, courts treat non-compete agreements in employment contracts 
as unenforceable then attempt to determine if the agreement fits one of the 
statutory exceptions. This tendency is natural given the language of title 15, 
section 217 of the Oklahoma Statutes: “Every contract by which any one is 
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any 
kind . . . is to that extent void.”
1
 An employment contract by which an 
employee agrees not to compete with the employer after termination of the 
employment relationship is certainly a “contract by which . . . one is 
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business.”
2
 But not 
every such agreement is “to that extent void.”
3
 Both statutory and judicial 
exceptions allow some of these agreements to be enforceable.
4
 The non-
statutory exceptions are a consequence of the judiciary’s long and evolving 
history with this area of the law. Ultimately, they are compelled by state 
and federal antitrust law, as well as economic policy inherited from the 
English common law. 
                                                                                                             
  Judge on the Court of Civil Appeals of the State of Oklahoma. © John F. Fischer 
2018. The author thanks his judicial assistants Cristina Romero and Tosha Sharp who 
provided their customary thoughtful review and comment.  
 1. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (2011). 
 2. Id.; see also Neal v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 13, ¶ 6, 480 P.2d 923, 924 (noting 
employees’ agreement not to compete with employer for one year after termination of 
employment “restrains the plaintiffs from pursuing a lawful profession”). 
 3. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217.  
 4. See, e.g., id. § 218 (creating an exception as to sale of good will of a business); id. § 
219 (dissolving a partnership); id. § 219A (soliciting the business of established customers 
of the former employer); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219B (Supp. 2013) (soliciting co-workers to 
leave a former employer); see also Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 
2002 OK 27, 61 P.3d 210 (accepting referrals of business, including former customers, from 
non-parties to the contract); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 18, 780 
P.2d 1168, 1175 (accepting the business of former clients “[w]here no active solicitation has 
occurred”); Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d 448 
(soliciting the business of former clients with respect to products or services not sold by the 
former employer). Whether the judicial exceptions survived the enactment of section 219A 
has not been addressed.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
756 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:755 
 
 
This Article demonstrates the antitrust nature of non-compete issues—
that all cases involve some application of the antitrust law’s rule of 
reason
5
—and argues that beginning to analyze non-compete agreements 
with the statutory exceptions to section 217 leads to the “dark woods”
6
 of 
statutory construction. In addition, this Article explores the issues that the 
2001 enactment of title 15 section 219A created for legal practitioners who 
draft non-compete agreements. Of particular focus is the effect of this 
statute on the long-settled holdings in Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident 
Insurance Co.
7
 and Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard,
8
 and the antitrust 
analysis of post-employment restraints employed in those cases. Both cases 
had established additional exceptions to section 217 and interpreted the 
statute pursuant to a test of reasonableness. This Article argues for an 
interpretation of section 219A that is consistent with the following: (1) the 
case law existing at the time the statute was enacted, and (2) the rule of 
reason that the Oklahoma Supreme Court previously adopted when 
interpreting section 217. 
I. The Historical Perspective 
For three reasons, it is particularly important for practitioners who work 
with post-employment restraints to understand the history of this body of 
law. First, the guild system from which restrictive covenant law originated 
is, to some extent, still with us. Modern corporations descended from the 
medieval guilds, and some guilds—bar associations, for example—remain 
to this day. Second, the historical perspective provides an opportunity to 
catalogue the development of exceptions to the general common law rule, 
which at one point prohibited all post-employment restraints. From that 
perspective, it becomes apparent that the relevant considerations are not 
much different today than they were three hundred years ago. In addition, 
the English courts’ focus on the reasonableness of the restraint when 
developing the common law supports application of the rule of reason in 
these cases. Third, the common law history explains the evolution of the 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (holding that 
antitrust laws are interpreted pursuant to the common law “standard of reason”). 
 6. “Midway on our life’s journey, I found myself / In dark woods, the right road lost.” 
DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE canto I, 3 (Robert Pinsky trans., Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux 1994) (1320).  
 7. 1970 OK 27, ¶ 12, 465 P.2d 448, 452. 
 8. 1989 OK 122, ¶ 11, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171. 
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economic context in which early non-compete cases were decided—from 
the guild system to a free market economy. 
A. The Guild System 
It is commonly accepted that all contracts restricting an individual’s 
ability to practice a lawful trade or profession were illegal at common law.
9
 
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized: “At first agreements in 
restraint of trade were those made by craftsmen and tradesmen having only 
a localized trade or business, and at a time when a craftsman was required 
to follow only his trade, and at that time the law permitted no restraint.”
10
 
As Blackstone noted, prior to the development of the guild system “every 
man might use what trade he pleased.”
11
 But Blackstone recognized that the 
Statute of Apprentices, passed in 1563, essentially revoked the freedom to 
practice any trade.
12
 That statute limited an apprenticeship to seven years 




During the height of the medieval guild system, guilds received patents 
from the sovereign.
14
 These patents essentially granted a monopoly over a 
particular trade because only guild members could practice the trade 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51 (“Originally all such contracts were considered to 
be illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious to the public as well as to the 
individuals who made them. In the interest of the freedom of individuals to contract, this 
doctrine was modified so that it was only when a restraint by contract was so general as to be 
coterminous with the kingdom that it was treated as void.”). But see Harlan M. Blake, 
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–32 (1960) (noting that 
statement was derived from four cases decided between 1414 and 1711 involving 
“unethical” masters who were attempting to extend the traditional period of indenture by 
apprentices and journeymen and, thereby, interfering with their right to practice a particular 
trade or engage in a particular business). Blake argues, with good reason, that the statement 
is true only as it relates to restraints on future employment that were inconsistent with the 
custom and practice in guilds regarding the rules for apprenticeships. Id. at 632–34. 
 10. Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 6, 3 P.2d 720, 722 (quoting the petition). 
 11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427.  
 12. Id. (citing Statute of Artificers 1563, 5 Eliz. 1 c. 4, § 31). 
 13. Statute of Artificers § 31; see also Blake, supra note 9, at 633 (“In 1563, the Statute 
of Apprentices made a seven-year apprentice period mandatory, but long before its 
enactment this period had been required by most of the guilds.”) (footnote omitted). 
 14. Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge: 
Northern Italy During the Early Modern Age, 45 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 577 (2004) (“The 
guilds’ tendency to slow progress down was balanced by the ability of city councils and 
princes to grant patents . . . .”). 
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associated with that guild.
15
 And only masters were admitted as members, 
after having served a lengthy apprenticeship.
16
 Guild members then 
restricted access to knowledge of the trade, the raw materials necessary to 
produce the end product, and the markets in which the product could be 
sold.
17
 As a result, it was difficult to practice a trade outside the framework 
of a guild. This result was “looked upon as a hard law, or as a beneficial 
one, according to the prevailing humor of the times.”
18
  
Blackstone described apprentices as a class of servants, usually bound 
for a term of years “to serve their masters, and be maintained and instructed 
by them.”
19
 In exchange for this maintenance and instruction, the rules of 
service protected guild masters’ interests; during the apprenticeship, the 
master enjoyed the exclusive benefits of the apprentice’s labor without 
having to pay wages.
20
 And the anti-competitive rule against practicing a 
profession without having served an apprenticeship protected the interest of 
the apprentice.
21
 Blackstone also noted that supporters of the Statute of 
Apprentices responded to the criticism that it tended to create monopolies 
with a pernicious effect on trade by pointing out that the guild system 
provided employment opportunities for the youth and created skilled 
workers, both of which generally benefitted trade and the public.
22
 
In the first reported non-compete case, John Dyer agreed that he would 
not practice his craft of dyeing fabric in the town of his former master for 
six months following the conclusion of his apprenticeship and gave a bond 
to secure that promise.
23
 When Dyer’s former master sued to enforce the 
terms of the agreement, the court not only denied relief but also stated that 
                                                                                                             
 15. See id.  
 16. See Blake, supra note 9, at 633. 
 17. Belfanti, supra note 14, at 572–76. 
 18. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *427. 
 19. Id. at *426. 
 20. Id.; see also Blake, supra note 9, at 633 (“A corollary of the long period of training, 
in which wages as such were either nonexistent or nominal, was that at its end the apprentice 
was to be free as a journeyman to practice his trade for hire wherever he chose until he could 
gain entry to the inner circle of craftsmen.”).  
 21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *428 (“[N]o one would be induced to undergo a 
seven years’ servitude, if others, though equally skillful, were allowed the same advantages 
without having undergone the same discipline . . . .”). 
 22. Id. (“But another of their arguments goes much further; viz., that apprenticeships are 
useful to the commonwealth, by employing of youth, and learning them to be early 
industrious . . . .”). 
 23. Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.); see also Blake, supra note 9, 
at 635 n.32 (citing Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26). 
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had the master been present in court when the case was heard, the judge 
would have thrown the master in jail.
24
 The master was entitled to Dyer’s 
exclusive service during the period of his apprenticeship.
25
 But once the 
apprenticeship ended, Dyer was free to practice his trade without further 
restraint from his master.
26
  
Discontent with post-employment restraints traces its roots to two early 
concerns with the guild system. First, the community would be deprived of 
the services of any apprentice prevented from working, and it was likely the 
apprentice would then become a public charge. Second, enforcement of 
covenants against practicing a given profession outside the guild would 
concentrate the benefits of the monopoly in relatively few masters.
27
 But 
these “medieval economic ideals”
28
 existed within a mercantile economy 
that eventually gave way to the industrial revolution. And the evolving 
public policy in England favoring a capitalist economy required a more 
“unrestrained” view of non-competition agreements to facilitate a 
developing free market economy.
29
 Not surprisingly, Adam Smith, the 
founding father of capitalism, was a critic of the guild system and argued 
that it restrained “free competition.”
30
 
It is therefore understandable that courts’ antagonism to post-
employment restraints began to wane during the three hundred years after 
Dyer’s Case.
31
 Decided in 1711, Mitchel v. Reynolds
32
 “is . . . the starting 
place for the modern law of restraints in employment contracts.”
33
 In 
Mitchel, the court enforced an agreement not to compete against the seller 
of a bakery business because the buyer acquired the existing location and 
                                                                                                             
 24. Bill C. Berger, From Dyer’s Case to Hard Bargains: Six Centuries of Covenants 
Not to Compete, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 39, 39.  
 25. See Blake, supra note 9, at 633, 636.  
 26. See id. 
 27. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(“The other [objection to restraints] was that such restraints tended to give the covenantee, 
the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excluded 
one competitor, and by the same mean might exclude others.”), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 28. Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 7, 3 P.2d 720, 722. 
 29. East-India Co. v. Sandys (1685) 10 St. Tr. 371 (Eng.). 
 30. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 101 (Sálvio Marcelo Soares ed., MetaLibri Digital Library 2007) (1776), 
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf. 
 31. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). 
 32. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 1 P. Wms. 181. 
 33. Blake, supra note 9, at 637. 
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the business’s existing customers.
34
 The court balanced the seller’s interest 
in continuing to practice his trade against the buyer’s expectation of 
purchasing an ongoing business and concluded that enforcing the 
agreement was beneficial to the public.
35
 “[A] man may, upon a valuable 
consideration, by his own consent, and for his own profit, give over his 
trade; and part with it to another . . . .”
36
 The court also considered the 
significance of the economic impact that a contrary decision might have; 
forcing buyers to risk future competition from sellers would reduce the 
sales prices that sellers could obtain.
37
 Mitchel was also the first case in 
which a court made the important distinction between a “general” and 




By the end of the nineteenth century, judicial attitudes had evolved even 
further. In Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that Mitchel v. Reynolds was decided in the following 
way:  
[U]nder a condition of things, and a state of society, different 
from those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded 
as inflexible, and has been considerably modified. Public welfare 
is first considered, and, if it be not involved, and the restraint 
upon one party is not greater than protection to the other party 
requires, the contract may be sustained.
39
 
And in the time since Gibbs, this focus on the effect that a particular 
restraint has on the public has become the central theme in antitrust 
analysis. As the Court later recognized, “[i]t is axiomatic that the antitrust 
laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’”
40
 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has similarly recognized the importance of 
promoting the public interest: “The fundamental test of the reasonableness 
of restraint is its effect on the public.”
41
  
                                                                                                             
 34. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347, 1 P. Wms. at 181. 
 35. Id. at 348–50, 1 P. Wms. at 182–88. 
 36. Id. at 349, 1 P. Wms. at 186.  
 37. Id. at 350–51, 1 P. Wms. at 190–91. 
 38. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co., 1906 OK 64, ¶ 7, 87 P. 315, 318. 
 39. 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889).  
 40. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 41. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499, 
506 (citing Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 1938)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/2
2020]       OKLAHOMA’S POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW 761 
 
 
As new exceptions to the general common law rule developed, 
employees were no longer bound to serve a lengthy apprenticeship without 
pay, and employers were no longer protected by the exclusive license of the 
guild system.
42
 This shift came after society and courts came to recognize 
that enforcing certain covenants to restrain trade could actually be 
beneficial to trade.
43
 In order to incentivize business owners to hire the best 
employees and train them, employers needed tools through which they 
could prevent those employees from “set[ting] up a rival business in the 
vicinity after learning the details and secrets of the business.”
44
 Employers 
were permitted to condition employment on post-employment restraints as 
long as they were no more restrictive than necessary to protect the 
employer’s legitimate interests and were not otherwise injurious to the 
public interest.
45
 Stated differently, if the post-employment restraint was 
merely secondary to the main purpose of an otherwise legitimate 
employment contract and did not tend to create the adverse economic 
impact resulting from common law monopolies, it was enforceable.
46
  
B. The Common Law Exceptions 
Since Mitchel was decided in 1711, five exceptions to the common law 
ban on employment restraints have been recognized: 
[C]ovenants in partial restraint of trade are generally upheld as 
valid when they are agreements (1) by the seller of property or 
business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to 
derogate from the value of the property or business sold; (2) by a 
retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner 
pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by 
competition or otherwise, with the business of the firm; (4) by 
the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with the 
business retained by the seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant, 
                                                                                                             
 42. Blake, supra note 9, at 638. 
 43. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (“After a 
time it became apparent to the people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that 
certain covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced.”), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 44. Id. at 281. 
 45. Horner v. Graves (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 7 Bing. 735. 
 46. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282. 
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or agent not to compete with his master or employer after the 
expiration of his time to service.
47
 
With respect to these exceptions, courts focus their analysis on the 
purpose of a particular restraint and whether it is “such only as to afford a 
fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and 
not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.”
48
 The historical 
case law determined that these five categories of restraints could be 
enforced without threatening the pernicious effect on trade that had resulted 
from the creation of monopolies.
49
 
II. The Antitrust Issues 
The “evils” of the monopoly include the monopolist’s ability to engage 
in the following activities: (1) fixing a price injurious to the public; (2) 
raising prices by limiting production; and (3) reducing quality while 
maintaining prices.
50
 Over time, agreements that artificially fixed the price 
of goods or services, limited the availability of those goods or services, or 
reduced their quality came to be known as contracts “in restraint of trade.”
51
 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp 
Electronics Corp., “[t]he term ‘restraint of trade’ in the [Sherman Act], like 
the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to 
a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite 
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances.”
52
  
Modern federal antitrust law began with the Sherman Act,
53
 which was 
enacted in 1890 and intended “to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 281. 
 48. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. [1894] AC 535, 567 
(HL) (UK). More recent cases have cited this nineteenth century approach with approval. 
See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281; Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 10, 3 P.2d 720, 722. 
 49. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282 (“It would be stating it too strongly to say that these 
five classes of covenants in restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at the 
common law; but it would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down for determining 
the validity of such an agreement that no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced 
unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful 
contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate 
fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by 
the other party.”). 
 50. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911). 
 51. Id. at 54. 
 52. 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).  
 53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
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liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade.”
54
 Sherman Act protections, like antitrust laws generally, represent 
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise”
55
 by protecting commerce from undue 
restraints.
56
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides as follows: “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”
57
  
But every contract restrains trade to some extent.
58
 Consequently, like 
the English court in Mitchel v. Reynolds,
59
 the Supreme Court first 
announced in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States that the 
Sherman Act should be interpreted pursuant to “the standard of reason 
which had been applied at the common law.”
60
 And the Court gave the 
classic statement of this rule of reason in Board of Trade of Chicago v. 
United States: “The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is 
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”
61
 
Application of the rule requires analyzing “facts peculiar to the business 
in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, 
and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption.”
62
  
A rule of reason analysis thus involves three considerations: (1) the 
relevant market (determined by the products and geographical area affected 
by the restraint);
63
 (2) the effect of the restraint on competition in that 
                                                                                                             
 54. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 55. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 56. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“The statute under 
this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, 
whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate 
or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, 
whether old or new, which would constitute an interference,—that is, an undue restraint.”). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 58. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.”). 
 59. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 1 P. Wms. 181. 
 60. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.  
 61. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.  
 62. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972) (citing Bd. of Trade, 
246 U.S. at 238).  
 63. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–72 (1966); see also Teleco, Inc. 
v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶¶ 12–13, 587 P.2d 1360, 1364 (adopting the same 
analysis for Oklahoma antitrust law). 
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 and (3) any pro-competitive benefits that outweigh the anti-
competitive effects of the restraint.
65
  
A. Oklahoma Antitrust Law 
Oklahoma’s general antitrust statute was originally enacted in 1910 and 
later renumbered in title 79.
66
 That statute was repealed in 1998
67
 and 
recodified—without change—in the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act.
68
 The 
statute provides: “Every act, agreement, contract, or combination in the 
form of a trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 




 Prior to the adoption of the Antitrust Reform Act, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court generally used federal antitrust law to resolve Oklahoma 
antitrust issues.
70
 For example, in the 1950s, the Supreme Court established 
that certain restraints are so injurious to competition that “because of their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue [they] 
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.”
71
 Oklahoma followed suit 
in the 1970s when it recognized that certain restraints constitute a per se 
violation of Oklahoma’s antitrust law.
72
  
                                                                                                             
 64. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). 
 65. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979); see 
also Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 12, 39 P.3d 754, 759 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)) (“Our analysis must proceed under the ‘rule of 
reason,’ which prohibits restraints only if the adverse effects on overall competition 
outweigh the pro-competitive benefits of the restraint.”). 
 66. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (superseded 1998). For the history of pre-statehood antitrust 
law, see State ex rel. Dabney v. Wm. Cameron & Co., Inc., 1930 OK 583, ¶¶ 8–16, 294 P. 
104, 105. 
 67. Repealed by 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 356, § 14 (effective July 1, 1998). 
 68. 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201–212 (2011).  
 69. Id. § 203(A). The statute is similar but not identical to the Sherman Act. By 
including every “act” within the statute’s proscription, some unilateral conduct was 
prohibited in contrast to only concerted action prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). Based on that distinction, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed an antitrust judgment based on unilateral conduct that 
violated Oklahoma’s antitrust statute. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 
82 F.3d 1533, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 70. See, e.g., Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶ 3, 587 P.2d 1360, 1362; 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 14 n.13, 561 P.2d 499, 505 
n.13. 
 71. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 72. See Teleco, ¶ 8, 587 P.2d at 1363.  
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In addition, antitrust analysis often distinguishes between a “horizontal 
restraint” and a “vertical restraint.” A “vertical restraint” involves “persons 
at different levels of the market structure.”
73
 One common example of a 
vertical arrangement would be a contract between a manufacturer and 
distributor, or a wholesaler and retailer.
74
 Each performs a different 
function but ultimately serves the same customers. In contrast, a “horizontal 
restraint” involves “an agreement between competitors at the same level of 




The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted the federal rule of 
reason to use when interpreting the general antitrust statute in 1977.
76
 Much 
of this Article focuses on the antitrust rule used for the interpretation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act
77
 and its Oklahoma counterpart, title 79, 
section 203(A).
78
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court is well acquainted with 
that rule, its definitional concepts, and the required analysis.
79
  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s policy of relying on federal antitrust 
law has now been codified as part of the Reform Act. Under this statute, 
“[t]he provisions of this act shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with 





                                                                                                             
 73. Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶ 10, 640 P.2d 948, 950 (quoting 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)). Ultimately, Crown Paint 
rejected the argument that an agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor 
constituted a horizontal restraint. Id. ¶ 12, 640 P.2d at 951. 
 74. See id. ¶¶ 10, 24, 640 P.2d at 950, 951. 
 75. Id. ¶ 10, 640 P.2d at 950 (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).  
 76. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499, 
506 (citing Topco, 405 U.S. at 596).  
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 78. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A) (2011). 
 79. See, e.g., Crown Paint, ¶¶ 9–12, 640 P.2d at 950–51 (rejecting argument that the 
contract was a per se violation and applying a rule of reason analysis to determine validity of 
vertical restraint) (citing and discussing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, ¶ 21, 587 
P.2d 1360, 1365 (determining the relevant product market and the absence of a submarket) 
(citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 401 (1956)).  
 80. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212. 
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B. Oklahoma’s Employment Related Antitrust Law 
Clearly, a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement is a 
“contract . . . in restraint of trade” in terms of both federal
81
 and Oklahoma 
antitrust law.
82
 Apparently, however, non-compete agreements in 
Oklahoma employment contracts are entitled to a special place in Dante’s 
Inferno. They even have their own statute. Title 15, section 217 provides as 
follows: “Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a 
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided 
by [sections 218, 219, 219A and 219B] of this title, . . . is to that extent 
void.”
83
 The first Oklahoma Legislature enacted section 217 in 1908, and its 
original language has largely endured, barring a minor amendment in 
2001.
84
 Further, the substantive language of section 217 is identical to the 
statute in effect in the Oklahoma Territory immediately prior to the 
enactment of section 217.
85
  
It is significant that the restraint of trade language included in section 
217 was identical to the statute that had been enacted for the Oklahoma 
Territory at the same time as the Sherman Act, which prohibited contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.
86
 As the Supreme Court 
recognized in Standard Oil, “where words are employed in a statute which 
had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this 
country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the 
context compels to the contrary.”
87
 And, that was the approach followed “in 
                                                                                                             
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 82. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203. 
 83. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (2011). 
 84. 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 3. 
 85. Compare 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217, with 1 WILSON’S REVISED AND ANNOTATED 
STATUTES OF OKLAHOMA 317 (1903) (“Every contract by which any one is restrained from 
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by 
the next two sections, is to that extent void.”). 
 86. W. A. MCCARTNEY, JOHN H. BEATTY & J. MALCOLM JOHNSTON, THE STATUTES OF 
OKLAHOMA, 1893, at 220 (Guthrie, Oklahoma State Capital Printing Co., 1893) (“Every 
contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or 
business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the next two sections, is to that extent 
void.”).  
 87. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (citing Swearingen 
v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 
(1898); Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 126 
(1904)).  
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There is no discord in the authorities that, where the 
[employment] restraint is no more extensive as to area than the 
protection of the party with whom the contract is made 
reasonably requires, the public not being likely to be injured by 
such an agreement, every other person being at liberty to practice 




Nonetheless, section 217 and its predecessor were viewed as changing 
the common law rule.
90
 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in Bayly, 
Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, “the common law rules which analyzed 
covenants not to compete based on their reasonableness did not survive the 
enactment of §§ 217–219.”
91
 Oklahoma adopted only two of the five 
common law exceptions to the prohibition on restraints of trade.
92
 Those 
two exceptions include: (1) agreements by the seller of a business not to 
compete with the buyer
93
 and (2) agreements by partners dissolving a 
partnership to cease carrying on the business of the partnership.
94
  
As a result, an employer in the new State of Oklahoma was prohibited 
from preventing a former employee from setting up a “rival business,” even 
though employers in the Indian Territory had been able to do so under 
Addyston Pipe’s common law rule.
95
 This literal interpretation prevailed in 
                                                                                                             
 88. Threlkeld v. Steward, 1909 OK 203, ¶ 6, 103 P. 630, 631 (enforcing an agreement 
by a physician who sold his medical practice not to practice medicine in the same area for 
two years). 
 89. Id. ¶ 5, 103 P. at 631. 
 90. Hulen v. Earel, 1903 OK 76, ¶ 9, 73 P. 927, 930 (refusing to enforce an agreement 
by one departing partner not to practice medicine in the vicinity of the remaining partner’s 
practice because it did not fit the statutory exceptions to the predecessor of 15 OKLA. STAT. § 
217 (2011)). “But, no matter what may be the rule in other states governing this class of 
contracts, we have a statute which governs such contracts in this [Oklahoma] territory.” Id. ¶ 
6, 73 P. at 930. 
 91. 1989 OK 122, ¶ 10, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171.  
 92. See John F. Fischer, II, Antitrust Law in Oklahoma, 48 JOURNAL [OKLA. B.J.] 413, 
420 (1977).  
 93. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 218 (2011). 
 94. Id. § 219. 
 95. Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); E.S. Miller Labs., Inc. v. Griffin, 1948 OK 149, ¶ 8, 194 P.2d 
877, 879. 
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the only two early section 217 cases that did not involve the sale of 
goodwill or the dissolution of a partnership.
96
 In both cases, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court failed to consider the reasonableness of the post-
employment restraint or the effect on competition if the restraint was 
enforced. 
Early cases viewed section 217 as providing a “rigid” rule that prohibited 
every contract limiting an individual’s freedom of employment, subject 
only to the two statutory exceptions.
97
 Courts apparently assumed that the 
employment contract, which effectively (if not expressly) restrained an 
employee from practicing a lawful trade or profession for a competitor 
during the term of employment, was not one of those prohibited by section 
217. But they did not interpret the term “every” in section 217 in the same 
manner as the term “every” in title 79, section 1.
98
  
However, in 1970, the Oklahoma Supreme Court began to abandon its 
rigid interpretation of section 217. In Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident 
Insurance Co., the court enforced a narrowly drawn non-compete 
agreement that prevented a departing insurance salesmen from selling the 
same lines of insurance to his former employer’s customers for two years.
99
 
In doing so, the court distinguished the health and accident insurance 
policies that the former employee previously sold from all other types of 
insurance.
100
 This analysis is consistent with determining that a relevant 
“submarket” (i.e., health and accident policies) existed and therefore made 
it unnecessary to determine the effect of the restraint on the market for all 
insurance products.  
                                                                                                             
 96. See Neal v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 13, 480 P.2d 923 (invalidating a provision in 
an insurance salesman’s employment contract preventing him from going to work for any 
other insurance company in the same territory for a period of one year); E.S. Miller Labs., 
1948 OK 149, 194 P.2d 877 (invalidating a provision in a pharmaceutical salesman’s 
employment contract that prevented him from going to work for any other pharmaceutical 
company in the same territory for a period of two years); see also A.W. Gans, Annotation, 
Statutes Prohibiting Restraint on Profession, Trade, or Business as Applicable to 
Restrictions in Employment or Agency Contracts, 3 A.L.R.2d 522 (1949). 
 97. See Wesley v. Chandler, 1931 OK 477, ¶ 8, 3 P.2d 720, 722.  
 98. Compare E.S. Miller Labs., ¶ 11, 194 P.2d at 879 (finding that a territorial restraint 
for a period of two years in a pharmaceutical salesman’s employment contract violated 15 
OKLA. STAT. 217 (1941)), with Thomas v. Belcher, 1939 OK 142, ¶ 4, 87 P.2d 1084, 1085 
(finding that an agreement between a wholesaler and a retailer limiting the retailer to a 
specific territory was not unreasonable or a violation of 15 OKLA. STAT. 217 (1931)). 
 99. 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 7, 12, 465 P.2d 448, 450–51. 
 100. Id. ¶ 8, 465 P.2d at 451. 
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The non-compete agreement in Tatum did not prevent the employee from 
selling other lines of insurance to his former employer’s existing customers; 
nor did it prohibit the employee from selling any line of insurance to any 
individual who was not a customer of his former employer.
101
 The non-
compete agreement merely required the employee “to maintain a ‘hands-
off’ policy with respect to those whom he knows are ‘insureds’ under then-
outstanding group policies, or franchise policies, of health and/or accident 
insurance issued by the plaintiff company.”
102
  
Given this limited restraint, the court concluded that the agreement was 
only intended to prevent the employee from using company information 
that he received and customer relationships that he developed for a 
reasonable period of time after the employment ended.
103
 Unlike the 
agreements that were invalidated in Miller Laboratories and Neal, the 
agreement in Tatum did not otherwise prevent him from competing with his 
former employer.
104
 As a result, the court held that the restrictive covenant 
did “not, in any manner or to any extent whatsoever, restrain the defendant 
from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind 
whatsoever, either in competition with the plaintiff or otherwise.”
105
 
Seven years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court further eroded its rigid 
interpretation of section 217. In Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma v. NCAA, the court applied a rule of reason analysis to find that a 
contract provision between a university and an athletic association that 
limited the number of coaches the university could hire did not violate 
Oklahoma’s general antitrust law.
106
 And the court also rejected the 
argument that the contract violated section 217.
107
 The court found that the 
contract did not prevent the coaches from practicing their trade or 
profession, but instead merely limited the number of coaches the university 
could hire.
108
 The court reasoned that “[a]n agreement which is reasonable 
and proper and which the parties have a right to make is not void as 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. ¶ 7, 465 P.2d at 451. 
 103. Id. ¶ 8, 465 P.2d at 451. 
 104. Id. ¶ 7, 465 P.2d at 451. 
 105. Id.  
 106. 1977 OK 17, ¶ 17, 561 P.2d 499, 506–07. 
 107. Id. ¶ 19, 561 P.2d at 508. 
 108. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
770 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:755 
 
 
contrary to public policy even though contractual duties toward third parties 
may be incidentally involved.”
109
 
In Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, the Oklahoma Supreme Court again 
considered the argument that a contractual restraint violated both title 79, 
section 1 and title 15, section 217.
110
 Crown Paint involved a contract 
between a paint manufacturer and one of its wholesale distributors in which 
the manufacturer agreed not to sell paint to the wholesaler’s retail 
customers.
111
 Although the manufacturer argued that a contract prohibiting 
it from selling paint to the wholesaler’s customers was illegal, the court 
held that the contract did not violate title 79, section 1.
112
 The court 
reasoned that it was a reasonable “vertical” restraint between companies at 
different levels of the market structure, not a “horizontal” market division 
agreement between competitors.
113
 The court also found that the contract 
did not violate section 217.
114
 After reviewing Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, the court held “that not all restraints of 




Finally, in Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court formally adopted the antitrust rule of reason that had previously been 
applied to title 79, section 1 for section 217 cases.
116
 “Although the rule of 
reason . . . had been incorporated as a matter of law into agreements falling 
within the parameters of 79 O.S. 1981 § 1, its application to § 217 was 
questionable before the Crown Paint and NCAA decisions.”
117
 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. (citing Gulf Refining Co. v. Boren, 50 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)). 
 110. 1981 OK 104, ¶ 4, 640 P.2d 948, 949. 
 111. Id. ¶ 1, 640 P.2d at 949. 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11–12, 640 P.2d at 950–51. 
 113. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 640 P.2d at 951. 
 114. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 640 P.2d at 952. 
 115. Id. ¶ 23, 640 P.2d at 952. 
 116. 1989 OK 122, ¶¶ 11–12, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170–71. 
 117. Id. ¶ 11, 780 P.2d at 1171 (footnotes omitted). Neither Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma nor Crown Paint involved a contract between an employer and an 
employee in the traditional sense. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma involved 
a contract between an employer and a third-party which limited the number of employees the 
employer could hire. 1977 OK 17, ¶ 17, 561 P.2d 499, 506–07. Crown Paint involved a 
contract between a principal and an independent agent not subject to the principal’s control 
necessary to create an employer/employee relationship. Crown Paint, ¶ 1, 640 P.2d at 949. 
But section 217 is not limited to contracts between employers and employees. It addresses 
“every contract” that restrains one from exercising a lawful trade or profession. See Robert 
C. Smith, Jr., Contracts, 4 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 193, 210–13 (1979). 
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The next section discusses the difference between the antitrust rule of 
reason and the version of the “rule of reason” that appears in the 
Restatement of Contracts.
118
 Despite the differences, it is clear that the 
Bayly court was referring to the antitrust rule, rather than the Restatement 
version. First, although the dissent described the rule of reason in 
Restatement terms,
119
 the majority adopted a different view.
120
 Although the 
majority cited section 515 of the Restatement of Contracts (1932) for the 
proposition that the rule of reason may be altered by statute, it did not cite 




Second, the Bayly court cited three United States Supreme Court cases to 
support its holding.
122
 All three of those cases hold that the antitrust version 
of the rule of reason applies to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
123
 The court 
also cited Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., in which the Oklahoma 




As a result, the rule of reason determines the enforceability of post-
employment restraints after Bayly. And, further, there is no practical 
difference between those covenants and contracts challenged under title 79, 
section 203. Therefore, the Oklahoma rule of reason cases decided pursuant 
to section 203 and its predecessor (section 1) are relevant to the rule of 
reason analysis when courts decide the enforceability of post-employment 
restraints pursuant to section 217. 
                                                                                                             
 118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(commenting that the promise is a violation if “(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to 
protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the 
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public”). 
 119. Bayly, ¶ 2, 780 P.2d at 1176 (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“A restraint is deemed reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the 
employer’s protection, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee and (3) is not 
injurious to the public.”) (footnote omitted). 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 10–12, 780 P.2d at 1170–73. 
 121. See id. ¶ 11 & n.8, 780 P.2d at 1171 & n.8. 
 122. Id. ¶ 11 & n.7, 780 P.2d at 1171 & n.7 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 
106, 181 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911)). 
 123. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 386–87; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180–82; Standard 
Oil, 221 U.S. at 64–65. 
 124. 1978 OK 159, ¶¶ 12–13, 587 P.2d 1360, 1364, cited in Bayly, ¶ 11 n.7, 780 P.2d at 
1171 n.7. 
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C. The Restatement Analysis 
The “reasonableness” of a post-employment restraint is not to be 
confused with its “fairness” to the employee because “[m]ere unfair 
competition, without more, does not violate antitrust laws.”
125
 However, 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 188 states that an employment 
restraint is unreasonable if (1) it “is greater than is needed to protect the 
[employer’s] legitimate interest, or” (2) “the [employer’s] need is 




Although the Restatement uses the term “rule of reason,”
127
 it is not the 
same rule of reason analysis used in antitrust cases. The two rules differ 
most notably in two facets. First, the Restatement does not require courts to 
conduct a relevant market analysis or balance the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive economic effects that a restraint has on the relevant market. 
Second, the Restatement uniquely considers the hardship an employee faces 
due to the restraint whereas hardship on the employee will not sanction an 
agreement which otherwise violates the antitrust laws.
128
  
As the Introductory Note to the Restraint of Trade topic states, non-
compete agreements “are governed by extensive federal and state” 
legislation, and federal antitrust law “has so completely occupied the field 
as to make the common law rules of little or no consequence except as they 
                                                                                                             
 125. Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 27, 39 P.3d 754, 764 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Fairness is generally associated with particular 
business practices and methods of competition deemed unfair such as the theft of trade 
secrets or the disparagement of a competitor or its products. See Tatum v. Colonial Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 10–12, 465 P.2d 448, 451–52. These kinds of practices 
are specifically precluded by other Oklahoma statutes and do not depend on the existence of 
any contract subject to review pursuant to section 217. Id. ¶ 12, 465 P.2d at 452; see also 
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 79 OKLA. STAT. § 81 (repealed 1998); Brenner v. Stavinsky, 
1939 OK 131, ¶ 17, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (enjoining a former employee, in the absence of any 
restrictive covenant, from using the former employer’s customer list to compete after the 
employment terminated). 
 126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); cf. Teresa L. 
Green, Note, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive Covenants in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2015) (advocating reliance on the Restatement “guidelines to help 
determine when a restraint becomes unenforceable”). 
 127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a. 
 128. Id. § 188(1)(b); see, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 681, 698–99 (1978) (holding an ethical ban on competitive bidding among professional 
engineers violated Sherman Act).  
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may give meaning to some of the more general terms of that legislation.”
129
 
The Note states that the Restatement discussion is directed at the common 
law rules and is not intended to displace aspects of the topic that are 




Even so, employee hardship was not even a prohibiting factor under the 
later common law rules. At common law, an employer could prevent a 
departing employee from competing regardless of any hardship on the 
employee if the restraint was otherwise reasonable.
131
 The Oklahoma Court 
of Appeals has made the following observation on the topic:  
The Restatement consideration of the fairness of the restraint 
from the employee’s perspective is derived from later common 
law cases. This focus . . . minimizes the rule of reason’s concern 
with the effect of the restraint on competition . . . . The 
“fairness” of particular competitive acts is the specific focus of 
other statutes; the “true test of legality” pursuant to a rule of 
reason analysis is whether the restraint “merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as 
may suppress or even destroy competition.”
132
  
In addition, the Restatement view of injury to the public is “measured 
against the urgency of the employer’s claim to protection, rather than 
against some extrinsic standard.”
133
 All post-employment restraints impose 
some hardship on the departing employee. But the Restatement’s employee 
hardship factor permits “consideration of the personal circumstances of the 
restrained employee—his financial circumstances or other factors unrelated 
to the employment relationship.”
134
 As a result, the hardship factor injects 
uncertainty into contract enforcement. From the employer’s perspective, the 
same post-employment restraint might be enforceable as to one employee 
but unenforceable as to that employee’s less fortunate colleague. The 
                                                                                                             
 129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note.  
 130. Id. 
 131. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  
 132. Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 31, 219 P.3d 547, 558 
(footnotes and citation omitted) (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
238 (1918)).  
 133. Blake, supra note 9, at 650.  
 134. Id.  
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hardship factor also forces the court to undertake “a particularly difficult 
task of balancing competing interests.”
135
 In contrast, the antitrust version 
of the “[r]ule of [r]eason analysis provides an analytical framework for 
consistent application of uniform legal principles to determine what is 




Ultimately, the hardship factor is based on a policy decision that assumes 
post-employment restraints result from “unequal bargaining power” and are 
made by employees who “give scant attention to the” consequences of their 
contracts.
137
 In this regard, the Restatement view privileges legal protection 
of employees over “respect for the power of independent persons to bargain 
for, or away, contractual provisions.”
138
  
Nonetheless, the Restatement and antitrust rule of reason would reach the 
same result in some cases. For example, an employee who develops a close 
relationship with the employer’s customers can be prevented from working 
in the same business in the area where the employer’s customers are located 
for a reasonable period of time.
139
 This is broader than the restraint 
approved in Tatum.
140
 However, in a relevant market, where the employer’s 
customers are located in a limited area, this would essentially accomplish 
the same result reached in Tatum.
141
  
Likewise, an employee who gains information that is valuable to the 
employer’s competitors and who can engage in the same trade or profession 
in fields unrelated to the employer’s business can be prevented from 
working in the same business as the employer for a reasonable period of 
time.
142
 The opportunity to practice the same profession, although in a 
different field, is consistent with the result in Tatum. 
These examples demonstrate the commonality between some aspects of 
the Restatement and the rule of reason’s focus on harm to consumers. 
                                                                                                             
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a. 
 136. Vanguard Envtl. Inc. v. Curler, 2008 OK CIV APP 57, ¶ 16, 190 P.3d 1158, 1165. 
 137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g. 
 138. Berry & Berry Acquisitions v. BFN Props., 2018 OK 27, ¶ 13, 416 P.3d 1061, 1068 
(quoting In re Kaufman, 2001 OK 88, ¶ 22, 37 P.3d 845, 855).  
 139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g, illus. 6. 
 140. 1970 OK 27, ¶¶ 8–10, 465 P.2d 448, 451. 
 141. Cf. Thayne A. Hedges Reg’l Speech & Hearing Ctr., Inc. v. Baughman, 1998 OK 
CIV APP 122, 996 P.2d 939 (holding that an agreement by speech and language pathologist 
not to contract with any entity served by employer for two years following termination was 
reasonable). 
 142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g, illus. 9. 
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Although Restatement section 188 was not intended to control in cases 
governed by a statute like section 217, it may, nonetheless, provide useful 
insights regarding the enforceability of some post-employment restraints—
at least from a historical perspective. But where the Restatement analysis 
departs from the antitrust version of the rule of reason by focusing on harm 




III. Antitrust Analysis of Post-Employment Restraints 
A complete rule of reason analysis is not necessary in every antitrust 
case. If the anticompetitive effect of a particular restraint is obvious, an 
“abbreviated analysis” dispensing with a detailed relevant market analysis 
may be appropriate.
144
 An abbreviated rule of reason analysis is often 
sufficient to determine the legality of a non-compete agreement in an 
employment contract. And the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet 
conducted a complete rule of reason analysis in a section 217 case 
involving a non-compete agreement between an employer and an 
employee.
145
 Nonetheless, the essential purpose of the analysis remains “the 
protection of competition, not competitors.”
146
 “The fundamental test of the 
reasonableness of restraint is its effect on the public.”
147
 This is no less true 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 11, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171–
72 (noting that the “rule of reason” incorporated into agreements subject to 79 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 1, now § 203, is incorporated into agreements subject to section 217). 
 144. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) (“The obvious anticompetitive 
effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (holding it unnecessary to precisely define the relevant 
market before finding a horizontal agreement to withhold x-rays from customers an 
unreasonable restraint of trade); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
109–10 (1984) (“This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive 
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (commenting that the legality of an 
agreement among competitors not to discuss prices could be determined without “elaborate 
study of the industry”). 
 145. See, e.g., Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, 273 P.3d 20, vacated on 
other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam) (holding that any deviation from the 
statutory exception in 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A invalidates the restraint). 
 146. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–25 
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis 
removed). 
 147. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 15, 561 P.2d 499, 
506 (citing Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 1938)). 
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for section 217, which “was adopted for the protection of individuals 
engaged in lawful professions, trades, and business, and for the benefit of 
the public.”
148
 In other words, for a “[r]estraint of trade to be illegal” 
pursuant to section 217, it “must be inimical to the public interest.”
149
 
Economic analysis supports this focus on harm to the public. The 
evolution of the enforcement of antitrust laws has been “heavily driven . . . 
by antitrust economics.”
150
 The last one hundred years of antitrust case law 
shows “a consensus that guidance must be sought in economics” and that 
                                                                                                             
 148. Neil v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 1970 OK 172, ¶ 8, 474 P.2d 961, 963. 
 149. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., ¶ 19, 561 P.2d at 508 (citing Richardson v. 
Paxten Co., 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. 1962)); cf. Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & 
Assocs., Inc., 1975 OK 122, ¶ 7, 540 P.2d 1161, 1164 (“The State Act has as its purpose 
prohibition of personal restraints on individual employment effecting the right to act freely 
and under no penalty or loss.”). Graham held that section 217 prohibited enforcement of a 
forfeiture provision in the employer’s profit-sharing plan, triggered by an employee’s 
resignation and employment by a competitor of the employer. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 540 P.2d at 1164. 
The plan was funded solely by contributions from the employer, and, according to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in an earlier decided case, 
the employee’s right to receive distributions of the funds allocated to his account during his 
six-year employment had not vested. See Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assocs., 
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1335, 1336–38 (N.D. Okla. 1970). Nonetheless, Graham treated the funds 
as compensation to which the employee was entitled and, noting that there was a split of 
authority on the issue, adopted the “more acceptable view” followed in Ohio which treated 
retirement benefits as part of an employee’s compensation. Graham, ¶¶ 10–11, 540 P.2d at 
1164–65.  
Graham is unique in its determination that after termination an employee can “act freely 
and under no penalty or loss.” Id. ¶ 7, 540 P.2d at 1164. Decided before Bayly and after 
Tatum, Graham did not consider whether the forfeiture provision was a reasonable restraint. 
Graham is also unique in its observation that the Sherman Act deals with a subject matter 
entirely different than section 217, i.e., monopolistic practices. Id. 
The federal court had specifically decided that the forfeiture provision did not violate 
section one of the Sherman Act. Graham, 319 F. Supp. at 1337. But it also decided that as a 
covenant not to compete, there was no showing that the forfeiture provision restrained the 
market for the employee’s services, and, therefore, no reason to analyze its reasonableness. 
Id. “[T]he only restraint that appears to be imposed on [employee] is that of his desire for 
payment of his inchoate share of the funds of the Plan. [Employee] makes no claim that this 
forfeiture provision coerces any prospective employer into not hiring him.” Id. at 1337–38. 
Bayly, and the cases on which it relies to invoke the rule of reason in section 217 cases, 
make the Graham court’s distinction of federal law in this area no longer tenable. 
 150. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW 
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 51, 58 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
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“[t]here is no generally accepted principle of statutory interpretation that 
shows that the courts were wrong to go this route.”
151
 
In any given market, the supply of workers and the demand for their 
services can be described by a typical supply/demand curve, with the rate of 
wages depicted on the vertical axis and the supply of workers depicted on 


























The “demand” curve for labor slopes down and to the right, representing 
employers’ increased willingness to hire more employees as wages 
decrease.
152
 The “supply” curve slopes up and to the right, indicating that 
more employees are willing to work as wages increase.
153
 
                                                                                                             
 151. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 35 (2d ed. 2001). 
 152. Matthew C. Palmer, Note, Where Have You Gone, Law and Economics Judges? 
Economic Analysis Advice to Courts Considering the Enforceability of Covenants Not To 
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According to one author, wages fall when courts refuse to enforce non-
compete agreements.
154
 As depicted in the following graph, when 
employers lack the protection of non-compete agreements, they are no 
longer willing to pay the same wage that they would pay to an employee 
who poses no threat of poaching the employer’s business upon termination 






















                                                                                                             
Compete Signed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1141 
n.154 (2005). 
 153. Id.  
 154. See id. at 1146 (“Similarly, under an unenforceability ruling, the demand curve for 
labor would shift downward.”); cf. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition 
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 376 
(2011) (predicting that enforcement of non-compete agreements would, (1) reduce mobility 
but result in longer tenured executives, (2) result in lower but more salary-based 
compensation for executives which would be offset by the employer’s increased investment 
in training and educating its managers thereby raising the manager’s individual human 
capital). This study does not attempt to quantify the economic value of longevity and better 
trained and educated executives in terms of the overall compensation package received by 
executives who are subject to enforceable non-compete agreements. 
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Depending on the nature of the market, unemployment may rise, as the 
equilibrium wage and number of employees who are willing to work for 
that wage decrease. Regardless, additional costs “will be borne by 
consumers as well as employers and employees.”
155
 This is the kind of 
adverse impact on competition and consumers that the antitrust laws are 
designed to prevent. “[A]ntitrust [law] is not only or primarily a system to 
ensure that business rivals do not behave unfairly or in a predatory manner 




Because antitrust law focuses on competition as opposed to individual 
competitors, it is difficult for an employee to show how being prevented 
from doing the same job, with the same customers but for a different 
employer, harms competition in the relevant market. This is especially true 
because “[i]t is not enough for plaintiff to allege[] that he has been 
injured—he must have suffered an antitrust injury.”
157
 From the consumers’ 
perspective, nothing changes when an employee changes employers; the 
two employers continue to compete for the consumers’ business. There may 
be economic consequences to the departing employee, but protecting 
against those consequences at the expense of all other employees whose 
wages are likely to suffer does not benefit consumers.  
More importantly, courts seek to preserve competition between the two 
employers. “The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately 
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and 
services . . . the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether 
competition is good or bad.”
158
 As long as the departing employee can 
continue to practice their trade or profession, reasonable restraints on the 
employee’s ability to compete with the former employer and necessary to 




                                                                                                             
 155. Palmer, supra note 152, at 1147. 
 156. Robert Pitofsky, Introduction to HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, 
supra note 150, at 5.  
 157. Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 27, 39 P.3d 754, 764 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 (1984)). Beville did not involve a contract between an 
employer and an employee but an alleged conspiracy between a hospital and a prospective 
employer by which the plaintiff was denied employment. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 39 P.3d at 756–57. 
Beville is relevant to section 217 because the damage issue regarding proof of an antitrust 
injury would be the same. Id. ¶¶ 27–29, 39 P.3d at 764. 
 158. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). 
 159. Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶ 7, 465 P.2d 448, 451. 
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IV. The Legacy of the “Tatum Rule” 
Since Tatum was decided, twelve reported cases have applied section 
217 to some form of post-employment restraint. In cases where the contract 
prohibited an employee from soliciting the business of former customers, 
courts consistently applied the “Tatum Rule” and enforced the restraint.
160
 
However, in three cases, the court found that the contract restricted 
customer solicitation to a greater degree than was permitted. In Bayly, 
Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 
prohibition was too broad to be judicially reformed because it also covered 
prospective clients and all lines of insurance, including those that the 
employee had not sold for the previous employer.
161
 In Howard v. Nitro-Lift 
Technologies, L.L.C., the court declined to modify the contract by limiting 
the non-solicitation of “past or present” customers to present customers.
162
 
And the court held that it could not determine whether the contract’s 
reference to “present customers” was equivalent to the “established 
customers” language in the statute.
163
 Finally, in Autry v. Acosta, Inc., the 
                                                                                                             
 160. See, e.g., Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27, ¶¶ 
19–20, 61 P.3d 210, 214–15; Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶¶ 31, 
36, 50, 219 P.3d 547, 558, 560; Thayne A. Hedges Reg’l Speech & Hearing Ctr., Inc. v. 
Baughman, 1998 OK CIV APP 122, ¶ 3, 996 P.2d 939, 941; Key Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Cox, 
1994 OK CIV APP 123, ¶¶ 8–9, 17, 884 P.2d 1213, 1215–17. 
For cases not involving a solicitation of former customers provision, see Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶ 19, 561 P.2d 499, 508 (holding the contract 
between third parties to limit the number of employees hired did not violate section 217); 
Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶¶ 11–18, 640 P.2d 948, 950–51 (holding an 
agreement by manufacturer not to sell to customers of wholesaler did not violate section 
217); Scanline Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks, 2011 OK CIV APP 88, ¶¶ 13–15, 259 P.3d 911, 
913–14 (refusing to enforce a contract that prohibited the employee from selling competing 
medical devices); Loewen Grp. Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109, ¶¶ 
22–24, 12 P.3d 977, 982 (refusing to enforce a contract prohibiting the employee from 
owning or working for a competing business); Cohen Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 1991 OK 
CIV APP 71, ¶¶ 1, 8, 817 P.2d 747, 748–49 (refusing to enforce a contract that prevented the 
employee from working as a real estate broker or “competing in any manner”).  
 161. 1989 OK 122, ¶¶ 16, 20, 780 P.2d 1168, 1174–75. 
 162. 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 26–28, 273 P.3d 20, 29–30, vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 
(2012) (per curiam). The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Opinion was vacated because its 
analysis conflicted with federal law on an arbitration issue: who gets to decide whether a 
non-compete agreement is enforceable, court or arbitrator. Nitro-Lift Techs., 568 U.S. at 20–
21. The United States Supreme Court determined that pursuant to federal law and the 
parties’ arbitration agreement it was for the arbitrator, not the court, to determine the 
enforceability of the non-compete agreement. Id. at 22. 
 163. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 26–28, 273 P.3d 20, 29–30. 
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court declined to determine whether the contract prohibition on soliciting 
the business of “Clients that [Employee] represented while employed” was 
equivalent to the statutory “established customers” language.
164
  
The two latter cases involved the construction and application of title 15, 
section 219A, which was enacted after Bayly was decided. The principal 
focus of this Article concerns the effect of section 219A on the Tatum Rule, 
the holding in Bayly, and antitrust analysis of post-employment restraints. 
 
The Oklahoma Legislature enacted title 15, section 219A in 2001: 
 A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer, 
whether in writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer 
after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be 
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by 
the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by 
the former employer as long as the former employee does not 
directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of 
goods and services from the established customers of the former 
employer.  
 B. Any provision in a contract between an employer and an 




The statute establishes a third statutory exception to the contracts 
prohibited by section 217: soliciting the business of a former employer’s 
established customers.
166
 The genesis for the statute appears to have been 
Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews.
167
 Loewen involved a 
prohibition on owning or operating a funeral home within fifteen miles of 
any home owned by the former employer.
168
 Because the employer owned 
several funeral homes, the court found that the employee was effectively 
                                                                                                             
 164. 2018 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 31, 410 P.3d 1017, 1023–24. 
 165. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A) (2011); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 4.  
 166. A fourth statutory exception was added in 2013 permitting agreements which 
prohibit the solicitation of employees of a former employer to change employers. 15 OKLA. 
STAT. § 219B (Supp. 2013); 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 194, § 1. That exception deals 
principally with unfair methods of competition and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 167. See 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 12 P.3d 977; see also Jeb Boatman, Note, Contract 
Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant Not to Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA. 
L. REV. 491, 492 (2002).  
 168. Loewen, ¶ 3, 12 P.3d at 979. 
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prevented from working anywhere in Oklahoma City, not just within fifteen 
miles of the home where the employee had worked.
169
 
To date, section 219A has been subject to two competing interpretations. 
Some courts interpret the statute as invalidating any post-employment 
restraint between an employer and employee except one prohibiting the 
departing employee from soliciting the business of the former employer’s 
established customers.
170
 According to this interpretation, the Legislature 
intended to “change” existing law and only permit one kind of post-
employment restraint. Such an interpretation would abandon the use of the 
rule of reason.  
An alternative interpretation argues that the statute was intended to 
resolve one aspect of the third rule of reason factor—namely that the 
procompetitive benefits of an agreement not to solicit established customers 
outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
171
 According to this view, section 
219A “codifies” the Tatum Rule but leaves the parties free to negotiate 




A. The “Change” Argument 
One author has suggested that section 217 reflects the motto of the State 
of Oklahoma, “Labor Omnia Vincit,”
173
 and represents an “employee-
friendly” law.
174
 That view is consistent with the literal language of section 
217 and the holdings in the two pre-Tatum cases: E. S. Miller Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Griffin
175
 and Neal v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co.
176
 The change 
interpretation implies that the Legislature intended to return to the pre-
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. ¶ 18, 12 P.3d at 981. 
 170. See, e.g., Boatman, supra note 167, at 501 (noting that section 219A permits a 
hands-off provision but “invalidates any other type of restrictive covenant between 
employers and employees”); Green, supra note 126, at 462–63 (“[Section 219A] does not 
allow employers to restrain the employee with noncompete agreements except for the 
limited exception where ‘the employee may be barred from soliciting . . . established 
customers.’”) (quoting Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶ 21, 273 P.3d 20, 
28, vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam)).  
 171. See Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d 547, 557.  
 172. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28, 219 P.3d at 556–57. 
 173. Translated as “labor conquers all.” ALBERT H. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 185 (1923), https://babel. 
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112105459467&view=1up&seq=211.  
 174. Green, supra note 126, at 459.  
 175. 1948 OK 149, ¶ 11, 194 P.2d 877, 879. 
 176. 1970 OK 13, ¶ 6, 480 P.2d 923, 924.  
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Tatum days, eliminate any consideration of the reasonableness of a post-
employment restraint, and avoid potentially inconsistent results by 
prohibiting all restraints except the “hands-off-existing-customers” restraint 
that was specifically approved in Tatum.
177
 To reach the change 
interpretation, one must construe the first sentence of section 219A(A) and 
section 219A(B) to mean that any post-employment restraint, other than a 
hands-off-established-customers provision, prevents a departing employee 
from engaging in “the same business as that conducted by the former 
employer” and is void.
178
  
B. The “Codification” Argument 
The codification interpretation is supported by the proposition that if the 
Legislature had intended to change existing law and return to the pre-Tatum 
approach, it could have done so expressly.
179
 The codification interpretation 
views section 219A as a statutory effort to preserve one kind of post-
employment restraint that had previously been deemed reasonable—the 
hands-off-existing-customers restraint—but to have done so within the 
broader context of the post-Tatum case law.
180
 This interpretation relies on 
traditional statutory construction and points out various inconsistencies and 
unintended results, including conflict with federal law, that adoption of the 
change interpretation would likely create. The codification interpretation 
reads the first sentence of section 219A as resonating the holding in Tatum; 
if the post-employment restraint does not absolutely prevent the departing 
employee from engaging in the same business as the employer and the 
restraint is otherwise reasonable, it is enforceable.  
V. The Proper Construction of Section 219A 
The change and codification interpretations of section 219A cannot be 
reconciled. This Article argues that the codification interpretation is 
sounder than the change interpretation and the more legally supported 
interpretation of the statute. Three reasons support this conclusion: (1) 
traditional principles of statutory construction, (2) the unintended 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Green, supra note 126, at 459–62. 
 178. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A) (2011).  
 179. See Boatman, supra note 167, at 512 (“In addition, if the legislature intended a 
return to a strict interpretation, like the standard used in Miller, for restrictive covenants not 
directly addressed by section 219A, it should pass a clear legislative directive to Oklahoma 
courts to abandon the rule of reason analysis for covenants not addressed by section 219A.”). 
 180. See Green, supra note 126, at 462–63. 
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consequences that would result from adopting the change interpretation, 
and (3) the potential for conflict with federal law. 
A. Statutory Construction 
The subject matter of section 219A was the focus of litigation and legal 
interpretation for decades prior to enactment. Given that history, the first 
question to resolve in applying the 2001 statute is whether the Legislature 
sought to abrogate that historical body of law when it enacted section 219A.  
[B]y amending a statute the Legislature may have intended (1) to 
change existing law or (2) to clarify ambiguous law. The exact 
intent is ascertained by looking to the circumstances surrounding 
the amendment. If the earlier version of a statute definitely 
expresses a clear and unambiguous intent or has been judicially 
interpreted, a legislative amendment is presumed to change the 
existing law. Nonetheless, if the earlier statute’s meaning is in 
doubt or uncertain, a presumption arises that the amendment is 
designed to clarify, i.e., more clearly convey, legislative intent 
which was left indefinite by the earlier statute’s text.
181
 
If one interprets section 219A to prohibit any post-employment restraint 
in an employment contract other than one preventing a departing employee 
from directly soliciting the business of the former employer’s established 
customers, then one must assume the Legislature intended to change the 
existing interpretation of section 217. But the Legislature chose to enact 
section 219A as a separate statute, rather than amend section 217. 
Numerous judicial decisions have subjected section 217 to a rule of 
reason type approach since 1970. Consequently, it is significant that the 
Legislature did not clearly state an intention to abrogate use of the rule of 
reason in section 217 cases when it enacted section 219A. As the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court recognized in Couch v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, “[f]ailure of the Legislature to change the law for a long period 
of time after judicial construction thereof amounts to Legislative approval 
and ratification of the construction placed upon the statute by the Court.”
182
  
In addition, the change interpretation requires the addition of language to 
section 219A. The phrase “shall be permitted to engage in the same 
                                                                                                             
 181. Samman v. Multiple Injury Tr. Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 182. 1956 OK 239, ¶ 6, 302 P.2d 117, 119 (per curiam) (citing McCain v. State Election 
Bd., 1930 OK 323, 289 P. 759). 
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business as that conducted by the former employer” must be interpreted to 
mean that any post-employment restraint, except a hands-off-existing-
customers provision, prevents an employee from engaging in the same 
business as the employer.
183
 But language expressing that interpretation is 
nowhere to be found in section 219A, “[a]nd[] the general rule is that 
nothing may be read into a statute which was not within the manifest 
intention of the legislature as gathered from the language of the act.”
184
 If 
the Legislature intended to prohibit any post-employment restraint except 
the one mentioned in section 219A, the Legislature could have done so in a 
clearer and more direct way. For example, the Legislature could have 
worded the statute to provide that “all post-employment restraints except a 
hands-off-existing-customers provision are void.” It did not.  
In fact, the statute specifically contemplates covenants by which the 
employee agrees not to engage in other kinds of competitive conduct when 
it discusses “[a] person who makes an agreement with an employer . . . not 
to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been 
terminated.”
185
 The only statutory limitation imposed on an “agreement . . . 
not to compete” is that the employer cannot prevent the departing employee 
from engaging in the same or a similar business.
186
 Consequently, an 
employee subject to this kind of non-compete agreement can engage in the 
same business as long as he or she does not compete with the former 
employer and, if included in the employment contract, “directly solicit the 
sale of goods, services or a combination of goods and services from the 
established customers of the former employer.”
187
 This interpretation is 
grammatically consistent with the language of the statute and does not 
depend on the addition of language not included in the statute.
188
 And this 
interpretation would preserve rule of reason analysis but leave the question 
of whether any other types of restraints are prohibited by section 217 for 
future determination.  
                                                                                                             
 183. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A). 
 184. Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 1956 OK 221, ¶ 19, 301 P.2d 212, 
216.  
 185. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A).  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Warren v. Stanfield (In re Guardianship of Stanfield), 2012 OK 8, ¶ 11, 276 P.3d 
989, 994 (“When determining the meaning of an unambiguous statute, the ordinary rules of 
grammar must be applied unless they lead to an absurd result.”) (citing Gilbert Cent. Corp. 
v. State, 1986 OK 6, 716 P.2d 654).  
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But, in a jurisprudential vacuum, even this interpretation of section 219A 
could lead to undesirable results. For example, the hands-off-established-
customers provision in section 219A(A) is not limited to the goods and 
services sold by the former employer. Nonetheless, an employer should not 
be able to prevent a departing employee from attempting to sell to anyone, 
including the former employer’s established customers, goods or services 
that the former employer does not sell. Yet the change interpretation would 
permit the employer to engage in this kind of overreaching and ultimately 
anticompetitive conduct.  
The change interpretation essentially reads section 219A as a 
replacement for section 217. That interpretation would be on firmer 
analytical ground if, for example, the statute provided: Every contract by 
which one is restrained from practicing a trade or profession is void, except 
one prohibiting an employee from soliciting the sale of goods, services or a 
combination of goods and services from the established customers of the 
former employer. The codification interpretation avoids the unintended 
consequences of that kind of language by construing section 217, as 
interpreted by the Tatum line of cases, alongside section 219A and giving 
effect to each statute.
189
 According to this view, section 217 permits 
reasonable post-employment restraints, and section 219A provides that a 
hands-off-established-customers covenant is reasonable. But the 
codification interpretation also leads to the conclusion that an agreement 
which prevents a departing employee from engaging in a completely 




Finally, the language in section 219A that authorizes a hands-off-
established-customers covenant fails to address the location and duration 
limitations that have previously been held to be necessary for such a post-
employment restraint to be enforceable. For example, section 219A does 
not impose any reasonable time limit for the enforcement of a restraint and 
could therefore apply indefinitely.
191
 The rule of reason prevents that result. 
                                                                                                             
 189. See Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. State ex rel. Vassar, 1940 OK 137, ¶ 10, 101 P.2d 793, 
796 (noting that statutes regarding the same subject are to be construed so as to give effect to 
every part and harmonize each section with the others).  
 190. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(A). 
 191. Similar issues have been noted in other contexts, for example, applying the same 
rule to high-level managers with little or no customer contact that is applied to employees 
with direct customer contact. See Memorandum from Gary W. Derrick, Subcommittee 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/2
2020]       OKLAHOMA’S POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW 787 
 
 
The change argument does not and would require courts to read a 
reasonableness test into the statute for certain aspects of the analysis where 
the existing statutory language does not resolve the issue. If, as the change 
interpretation requires, section 219A can be implemented from the language 
of the statute alone and without reference to the rule of reason, no principle 
of statutory construction is available to create exceptions for what the 
statute leaves out. But it is fundamental that statutory construction must 
“begin with consideration of the language used and courts should not read 
into a statute exceptions not made by the Legislature.”
192
 If the Legislature 
abrogated use of the rule of reason for interpreting section 217, it also 
abrogated use of that rule to determine the reasonableness of a particular 
hands-off provision covered by section 219A.  
As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, it is more likely that the 
Legislature intended to “more clearly convey” one of the judicially created 
exceptions to section 217 when it enacted section 219A, thus codifying the 
hands-off-existing-customers covenant of the Tatum Rule.
193
 That 
construction also avoids problematic results that the Legislature likely did 
not intend to create.  
B. Unintended Consequences of the Change Interpretation 
The change construction of section 219A would also conflict with long-
settled issues regarding the interpretation of section 218. For example, a 
corporate employee who owns company stock can agree not to solicit 
established or potential customers upon termination of the employment 
relationship and sale of stock back to the corporation.
194
 That kind of 
agreement has been consistently upheld.
195
 Although the sale of good will 
                                                                                                             
Chair, to the Bus. Ass’ns Section of the Okla. Bar Ass’n (June 27, 2001) (on file with 
author); see also Boatman, supra note 167, at 510–11. 
 192. Ledbetter v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enf’t Comm’n, 1988 OK 117, ¶ 7, 764 
P.2d 172, 179.  
 193. See Samman v. Multiple Injury Tr. Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307 
(discussing general statutory interpretation principles).  
 194. Compare Key v. Perkins, 1935 OK 142, ¶¶ 3, 14, 46 P.2d 530, 531–32 (finding the 
sale of twenty percent of the corporation’s stock found sufficient to enforce the restrictions), 
with Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989 OK 122, ¶ 9, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170 (finding 
the sale of a “miniscule amount of stock—.08%” insufficient to invoke the goodwill 
exception in sections 217 and 218).  
 195. Berry & Berry Acquisitions v. BFN Props. LLC, 2018 OK 27, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 1061, 
1069. Berry settles a previously assumed but unresolved issue of Oklahoma law. See Oliver 
v. Omnicare, Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 93, ¶¶ 6, 14, 103 P.3d 626, 629–30 (holding that 
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associated with the company’s stock has historically been viewed as a 
section 218 case,
196
 a partial stock sale accompanied by a general non-
compete agreement is a “provision in a contract between an employer and 
an employee in conflict with the provisions of [section 219A].”
197
 As the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized in Hogg v. Oklahoma County 
Juvenile Bureau, “[w]hen a strict literal construction leads to an 
inconsistent or incongruent result between provisions, we will utilize rules 




The change interpretation also creates a conflict between section 217 and 
Oklahoma’s general antitrust statute.
199
 Although section 217 addresses 
contracts that restrain the practice of a trade or profession, both statutes 
address contracts that restrain trade.
200
 Although the antitrust statute is 
clearly interpreted pursuant to the antitrust rule of reason,
201
 the change 
interpretation would apply a different analytical rule to contracts which 
restrain the practice of a lawful trade or profession. 
                                                                                                             
Oklahoma public policy prevented enforcement of non-compete agreement despite Ohio 
choice of law provision in the employment contract); Herchman v. Sun Med., Inc., 751 F. 
Supp. 942, 947 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that a non-compete agreement in a Texas 
employment contract violated Oklahoma public policy and was unenforceable in 
Oklahoma). The public policy issue in Berry was whether a restrictive covenant clearly 
enforceable pursuant to the Texas choice of law provision in an employment contract 
“violates the public policy of Oklahoma—a determination that hinges on the whether the 
non-compete is enforceable under Oklahoma law.” Berry, ¶ 14, 416 P.3d at 1068–69. As a 
result, without respect to the enforceability of a restrictive covenant pursuant to the law of 
any other state chosen by the parties to govern an employment contract, if the covenant 
violates Oklahoma antitrust law, it will not be enforced in this State.  
 196. See, e.g., Bayly, ¶ 13 n.11, 780 P.2d at 1172 n.11.  
 197. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A(B) (2011).  
 198. 2012 OK 107, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 29, 33 (citing St. John Med. Ctr. v. Bilby, 2007 OK 37, 
¶ 6, 160 P.3d 978, 979). 
 199. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203 (2011). 
 200. Compare 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (“Every contract by which any one is restrained 
from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as 
provided by Sections 218 and 219 of this title, or otherwise than as provided by Section 2 of 
this act, is to that extent void.”), with 79 OKLA. STAT. § 203(A) (“Every . . . contract . . . in 
restraint of trade or commerce within this state is hereby declared to be against public policy 
and illegal.”).  
 201. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 1977 OK 17, ¶¶ 15–18, 561 
P.2d 499, 505–08; see also 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (“The provisions of this act shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Federal Antitrust Law 15 U.S.C., Section 1 et seq. 
and the case law applicable thereto.”).  
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C. Conflict with Federal Law 
The change argument further produces a conflict between section 217 
and federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act applies to restraints of trade 
“among the several States, or with foreign nations.”
202
 In adopting the 
Sherman Act, “Congress meant to deal comprehensively and effectively 
with the evils resulting from contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in 
restraint of trade, and to that end to exercise all the power it possessed.”
203
 
Further, “as the dimensions and complexity of our economy have grown, 
the federal power over commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the 
Sherman Act, have experienced similar expansion.”
204
 As Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause has long been interpreted to extend to 
local activities that substantially affect interstate commerce as well as 
activities actually occurring in interstate commerce,
205
 it has become clear 
“that the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied 
under either the ‘in commerce’ or the ‘effect on commerce’ theory.”
206
  
It is now rare to find a business that does not involve or effect interstate 
commerce.
207
 Consequently, where the Sherman Act applies, a post-
employment restraint prohibiting solicitation of business from established 
                                                                                                             
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).  
 203. Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).  
 204. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (footnote omitted).  
 205. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).  
 206. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (citing 
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf Oil Co. v. Copp Paving 
Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1974); United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfr. Ass’n, 
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219, 235–37 (1948)).  
 207. See, e.g., Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 329 (holding that although a hospital’s 
primary activity was providing health care services in a local market, an excluded 
ophthalmologist showed that the hospital was engaged in interstate commerce for Sherman 
Act jurisdiction); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435–36 (1990) 
(holding a group refusal to accept appointments of indigent defendants by private practice 
attorneys in the District of Columbia was a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Arizona v. 
Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding that an agreement by 
physicians not to exceed maximum fee schedule established for patients in one particular 
county in Arizona was a per se violation of the Sherman Act); McLain, 444 U.S. at 245 
(holding that real estate brokerage activity facilitating local real estate transactions had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce satisfying Sherman Act jurisdictional requirement); 
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783–85 (1975) (finding that title examination by 
local attorneys as part of real estate transactions was an integral part of interstate commerce 
for Sherman Act jurisdiction). 
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customers—even if sanctioned by section 219A—will still have to satisfy a 
federal rule of reason analysis to be enforceable.
208
 The following example 
illustrates the problem.  
When executed, an employment contract that contains a post-
employment restrictive covenant is similar to a vertical restraint. The 
employee agrees not to work for a competitor during the term of 
employment. But the agreement does not raise any antitrust issues because 
the contract is analogous to an exclusive dealing arrangement between a 
manufacturer and its distributor, or a wholesaler and its retailer. In addition, 
the employer generally lacks market power to adversely affect competition 
in the relevant market as a result of the contract.
209
 If an employee subject 
to a section 219A-type “hands off” non-compete agreement leaves and goes 
to work for the employer’s competitor, the “vertical” nature of the 
agreement does not change—it is still an agreement between an employer 
and a former employee. It does not become a horizontal agreement between 
the former employer and the new employer merely because the employee 
takes existing contractual obligations to the new employment. And the 
agreement would be generally enforceable, regardless of whether federal 
law or Oklahoma law applies.  
However, if the employee leaves and starts a competing business, the 
non-compete agreement becomes a “horizontal restraint,” that is, one 
between two competitors at the same market level.
210
 A market division 
agreement between competitors withdraws the “supply” of potential sellers 
and raises prices.
211
 An agreement between competitors to divide territories, 
or in the case of a non-compete agreement, to divide customers within a 
relevant market would violate both federal and State antitrust laws.
212
 
                                                                                                             
 208. See OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“The State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union, and the constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.”).  
 209. See Beville v. Curry, 2001 OK 1, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d 754, 759–60 (requiring proof of 
market power to establish antitrust injury in the absence of actual adverse effects on 
competition).  
 210. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).  
 211. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW 
AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 236 (5th ed. 1994).  
 212. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 295–96 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(finding agreement among competitors to allocate geographical territories and some 
customers within those territories exclusively to each competitor violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 1981 OK 104, ¶¶ 
9–11, 640 P.2d 948, 950–51 (following federal law); see also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 
498 U.S. 46, 47, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding an agreement by bar review companies 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/2
2020]       OKLAHOMA’S POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT LAW 791 
 
 
The change interpretation of section 219A forecloses this method of 
analysis and would enforce a hands-off-established-customers non-compete 
agreement even though the former employee’s new business might offer a 
lower price, better service, or improved product. This result becomes even 
more problematic when one considers that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers 
regardless of how those prices are set.”
213
 “The assumption that competition 
is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that 
all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not 
just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to 
select among alternative offers.”
214
 Application of the change interpretation 
to this example would produce an obviously problematic result from both a 
federal antitrust law and supremacy clause perspective.  
Further, even if such a non-compete agreement is treated as a horizontal 
agreement, the employer may still be able to show that there are 
procompetitive benefits to consumers that outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects. Although the change interpretation of section 219A forecloses that 
debate, the rule of reason analysis does not. “In its design and function the 
rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect 
that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that 
are in the consumer’s best interest.”
215
  
A different example clearly illuminates the difference between the 
change interpretation of section 219A and a rule of reason analysis. Assume 
an automobile salesperson employed by a high-end, luxury new car dealer 
is subject to a section 219A type hands-off-existing-customers agreement. 
If the salesperson leaves and goes to work in the relevant market for a 
                                                                                                             
not to compete in each other’s designated territory to be illegal); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 
(holding an agreement by supermarket owners to operate only in their exclusive territory to 
be illegal); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354–56 (1967) (holding an agreement 
by competitors who owned manufacturer to sell its products only in their assigned territories 
to be illegal); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (describing agreements 
to divide markets by competitors as per se illegal). Market division agreements between 
competitors have generally been treated as per se offenses. However, in Rothery Storage & 
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court applied a rule 
of reason analysis after concluding that Topco and Sealy had been overruled. In Palmer, the 
Court’s citation to Topco for the proposition that market division agreements by competitors 
are “classic examples” of a per se antitrust violation strongly suggests that Topco has not 
been overruled. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49 (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).  
 213. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).  
 214. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).  
 215. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). 
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competitor in the high-end, luxury new car market, the first employer is 
entitled to enforce the non-compete agreement and prevent the salesman 
from contacting that employer’s established customers, regardless of 
whether the change or codification interpretation of section 219A is 
followed.  
However, if the salesperson leaves and goes to work for a used truck 
dealer, the first employer would still be entitled to enforce the non-compete 
agreement pursuant to the change interpretation of section 219A. But 
because this business would likely satisfy the interstate commerce 
jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act, federal law would mandate a 
rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason analysis would focus on the 
difference between the high-end, luxury new car market and the used truck 
market to determine whether they were in the same or different product 
markets. If the court established they comprised two different product 
markets, the first employer would bear the burden to show that there were 
procompetitive benefits that outweighed the anticompetitive effects of 
enforcing the non-compete agreement. Because a high-end, new car dealer 
is unlikely to have an interest in customers seeking to purchase used trucks, 
the non-compete agreement would presumably fail the rule of reason 
analysis and be held unenforceable.
216
  
Unlike the change argument, the codification interpretation would 
harmonize the construction of section 219A with federal antitrust law and 
avoid inconsistent outcomes that would entirely depend upon the existence 
or absence of interstate commerce. The codification interpretation also 
honors the intent of the Antitrust Reform Act to align Oklahoma antitrust 
law “consistent with Federal Antitrust Law 15 U.S.C., Section 1 et seq. and 
the case law applicable thereto.”
217
 
VI. Judicial Interpretation of Section 219A 
To date, six cases have addressed the application of section 219A.
218
 To 
read these cases in anything other than the historical context of section 217 
                                                                                                             
 216. Cf. Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27, ¶ 18, 61 
P.3d 210, 214 (“One surgeon has no legitimate business interest in another surgeon’s referral 
base regardless of a past employer-employee relationship.”). 
 217. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (2011). 
 218. See Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶¶ 6, 23, 273 P.3d 20, 24, 29 
(holding a prohibition on employment with any company in the same business in the United 
States held unenforceable), vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012); Mammana, ¶ 19 
n.5, 61 P.3d at 214 n.5; Autry v. Acosta, Inc., 2018 OK CIV APP 8, ¶ 32, 410 P.3d 1017, 
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jurisprudence risks the “inconsistent or incongruent” results to be avoided 
in statutory construction.
219
 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals made the 
following observation in Inergy Propane, LLC v. Lundy: 
Section 219A was not enacted in a vacuum. Nor does the 
language of the statute evidence any legislative intent to supplant 
the existing and extensive case law interpreting section 217. 
Those cases and the analytical approach developed therein 
provide the context within which to resolve the issues not 
specifically addressed by the language of section 219A. What 
the statute does eliminate is the need for part of the rule of 
reason analysis. . . . [T]he pro-competitive benefits of an 
agreement between an employer and an employee preventing the 
employee from “directly solicit[ing] the sale of goods, services 
or a combination of goods and services from the established 
customers of the former employer” after termination of the 




The Court’s interpretation of section 219A in Lundy is consistent with 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s approach in Cardiovascular Surgical 
Specialists Corporation v. Mammana.
221
 The third aspect of the non-
compete provision in that case provided that the employee would not 
“solicit or divert business of any patient who had been a patient of 
Cardiovascular within one year of the termination, without 
Cardiovascular’s advanced written consent.”
222
 The Mammana court held 
that this non-compete provision was “consistent with the Legislature's 
                                                                                                             
1023–24 (holding a prohibition on engaging in the same business unenforceable); Scanline 
Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks, 2011 OK CIV APP 88, ¶¶ 12–15, 259 P.3d 911, 913–14 (holding a 
prohibition on selling competing medical devices in the United States unenforceable); Inergy 
Propane, LLC v. Lundy, 2009 OK CIV APP 8, ¶¶ 24–28, 219 P.3d 547, 555–57; Eakle v. 
Grinnell Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1310, 1313 (E.D. Okla. 2003) (noting that, after 
extensive discussion, section 219A was not applicable but still holding a broad prohibition 
on post-employment competition in employment agreement enforceable because part of a 
stock sale). 
 219. Hogg v. Okla. Cty. Juvenile Bureau, 2012 OK 107, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 29, 33. 
 220. Lundy, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d at 557. 
 221. See Mammana, ¶¶ 14–20, 61 P.3d at 213–15 (interpreting section 217).  
 222. Id. ¶ 15, 61 P.3d at 214.  
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In Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C., the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court commented on the Lundy decision: “The [Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals] determined, at least in some instances, the rule of reason would be 
applicable even under the confines of [section 219A]. It held that the statute 
addressed the balance of competitive effects under a rule of reason analysis 
finding the non-solicitation agreement enforceable.”
224
  
In Lundy, the Court of Civil Appeals used a rule of reason approach to 
determine the enforceability of a hands-off-existing-customers non-compete 
agreement.
225
 Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not repudiate or 
overrule the Lundy analysis in Nitro-Lift, the court did note that Lundy was 
“persuasive only and lack[ed] precedential effect.”
226
 
In Nitro-Lift, the Supreme Court analyzed a restrictive covenant that 
prohibited a departing employee from working for any other company 
engaged in the same business as the employer for a period of two years and 
also prohibited solicitation of past and present customers.
227
 The Nitro-Lift 
court interpreted section 219A in the following way:  
It provides that where an employee has executed a covenant not 
to compete with an employer, the employee “shall be permitted 
to engage in the same business as that conducted by the 
former employer or in a similar business as that conducted 
by the former employer as long as the former employee does 
not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a 
                                                                                                             
 223. Id. ¶ 19 n.5, 61 P.3d at 214 n.5. Because Dr. Mammana signed the contract before 
section 219A became effective, it is not clear whether the Court was applying the “new” law 
or merely acknowledging its existence. The Court did not engage in an analysis of the 
statute’s retroactive effect. However, it is noteworthy that section 219A became effective 
after the case was tried but before the appellate decision was rendered. And, there are well-
settled legal principles which would justify retroactive application of the statute. See, e.g., 
Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004; Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
1981 OK 8, 623 P.2d 613. “[Section] 219A is the Legislature’s pronouncement on 
Oklahoma’s public policy regarding covenants not to compete.” Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 20, 273 
P.3d at 28 (footnote omitted).  
 224. Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 1 n.3, 273 P.3d at 23 n.3. 
 225. Lundy, ¶ 28, 219 P.3d at 557. 
 226. Nitro-Lift Techs., ¶ 1 n.3, 273 P.3d at 23 n.3. 
 227. Id. ¶ 6, 273 P.3d at 24. 
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combination of goods and services from the established 
customers of the former employer.”
228
 
According to Nitro-Lift, section 219A was enacted to “prohibit[] 
employers from binding employees to agreements which bar their ability to 
find gainful employment in the same business or industry as that of the 
employer.”
229
 Although stated differently, this is essentially the same 
concern expressed forty years earlier by the Tatum court: “[T]he contractual 
provision in the present case does not, in any manner or to any extent 
whatsoever, restrain the defendant from exercising a lawful profession, 
trade, or business of any kind whatsoever, either in competition with the 
plaintiff or otherwise.”
230
 What differentiates the two decisions is their use 
of rule of reason analysis. The former did not utilize such analysis, relying 
on statutory construction to resolve the case; the latter introduced rule of 
reason analysis to Oklahoma law along with judicial balancing of the 
legitimate interests of employers and employees in particular cases in the 
service of economic competition for the ultimate benefit of consumers. 
Conclusion 
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court observed that in a span of less 
than one hundred years, the changing economic environment had 
transformed market practices that had been deemed harmful at common law 
into procompetitive benefits.
231
 As the Court recognized, “contracts or 
acts . . . at one time deemed to be of such a character as to justify the 
inference of [competitive harm] . . . were at another period thought not to 
be of that character.”
232
 Moreover, it is not just the law’s view of particular 
business conduct that has changed—the growth in complexity of our 
modern economy has manifested a similar expansion in “the federal power 
over commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act.”
233
  
Section 219A, when interpreted in accordance with section 217 
jurisprudence, statutorily permits one kind of post-employment restraint 
that had previously been determined reasonable. Pursuant to that 
interpretation, section 219A codifies the “hands-off-existing-customers” 
                                                                                                             
 228. Id. ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 28 (quoting 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A).  
 229. Id. ¶ 21, 273 P.3d at 28.  
 230. Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, ¶ 7, 465 P.2d 448, 451. 
 231. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1911).  
 232. Id. at 58–59. 
 233. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
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part of the Tatum Rule and protects competition by encouraging employers 
“to employ the ablest assistants, and to instruct them thoroughly.”
234
 At the 
same time, consumers benefit from the limitation that section 219A permits 
because departing employees may “find gainful employment in the same 
business or industry as that of the employer.”
235
 Because section 219A 
codified a specific exception to the prohibition on post-employment 
restraints in section 217, rather than replacing section 217, the rule of 
reason provides safeguards against those post-employment restraints not 
specifically authorized by section 219A.  
Although Oklahoma law on post-employment restraints is not policy 
neutral, it does not necessarily “disfavor” such restraints. In the nineteenth 
century, the Supreme Court established a policy preference in favor of 
agreements that benefit consumers and competition, based on a choice to 
embrace one economic system over the alternatives. What benefits 
consumers depends, to some extent, on evolving economic principles and 
changes in the way people conduct business. The challenge of the law in 
this area, is (as it has historically been) to adapt fundamental legal 
principles to current market conditions. A flexible application of the rule of 
reason has successfully accomplished that adaption in the past, and there is 
no reason why it cannot continue to do so. 
 
                                                                                                             
 234. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899).  
 235. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, ¶ 21, 273 P.3d 20, 28, vacated on 
other grounds, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (per curiam) (citing Scanline Med., L.L.C. v. Brooks, 
2011 OK CIV APP 88, 259 P.3d 911).  
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